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ABSTRACT
We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and
greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material
or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this
"overjustification effect" can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by
extrinsic incentives. We also identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and those
where disclosing one's generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the choice by public and private
sponsors of incentive levels, their degree of confidentiality and the publicity given to agents'
behavior. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.
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tirole@cict.frPeople commonly engage in activities that are costly to themselves and mostly beneﬁt others. They
volunteer, help strangers, vote, give to political or charitable organizations, donate blood, join rescue squads
and sometimes sacriﬁce their life for strangers. Many experiments and ﬁeld studies conﬁrm that a signiﬁcant
fraction of people engage in altruistic or reciprocal behaviors. A number of important phenomena and
puzzles, however, cannot be explained by the sole presence of individuals with other-regarding preferences.
First, providing rewards and punishments to foster prosocial behavior sometimes has a perverse eﬀect,
reducing the total contribution provided by agents. Such a crowding-out of “intrinsic motivation” by extrinsic
incentives has been observed in a broad variety of social interactions (see Bruno S. Frey (1997) and Frey and
Reto Jegen (2001) for surveys). Studying schoolchildren collecting donations for a charitable organization,
Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini (2000b) thus found that they collected less money when given performance
incentives (see also Frey and Lorenz Götte (1999) on volunteer work supply). These ﬁndings are in line
with the ideas in Richard Titmuss (1970), who argued that paying blood donors could actually reduce
supply. On the punishment side, George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens (1982), suggested that imposing
stiﬀer penalties could sometimes undermine individuals’ “internal justiﬁcation” for obeying the law. Frey
(1997) provided some evidence to that eﬀect with respect to tax compliance and Gneezy and Rustichini
(2000a) found that ﬁning parents for picking up their children late from day-care centers resulted in more
late arrivals. In experiments on labor contracting, subjects provided less eﬀort when the contract speciﬁed
ﬁnes for inadequate performance than when it did not (Fehr et al. (2001) and Fehr and Gächter (2002))
and they behaved much less generously when the principal had simply removed from their choice set the
most selﬁsh options (Armin Falk and Michael Kosfeld (2004)). These ﬁndings extend a large literature in
psychology documenting how explicit incentives can lead to decreased motivation and unchanged or reduced
task performance (see, e.g. Edward Deci (1975), Deci and Richard Ryan (1985)). In studying this class of
phenomena, however, one cannot simply assume that rewards and punishments systematically crowd out
spontaneous contributions. Indeed, there is also much evidence to support the basic premise of economics
that incentives are generally eﬀective, for instance in workplace contexts (e.g., Robert Gibbons (1997), Canice
Prendergast (1999) and Edward P. Lazear (2000a,b)). A more discriminating analysis is thus required.
A second set of issues relates to the fact that people commonly perform good deeds and refrain from
selﬁsh ones because of social pressure and norms that attach honor to the former and shame to the latter
1(e.g., Dan Batson (1998), Richard B. Freeman (1997)). Charitable and non-proﬁt institutions make ample
use of donors’ desire to demonstrate their generosity and selﬂessness (or at least the appearance thereof),
with displays ranging from lapel pins and T-shirts to plaques in opera houses or hospitals and buildings
named after large contributors. The presence of a social signalling motive for giving is also evident in the
fact that anonymous donations are both extremely rare —typically, less than 1 percent of the total number2—
and widely considered to be the most admirable. Conversely, boasting of one’s generous contributions is often
self-defeating. Codes of honor, whose stringency and scope varies considerably across time and societies, are
another example of norms enforced largely through feelings of shame (losing face) or glory. To understand
these mechanisms it is again important to not posit exogenous social constraints, but rather to model the
inferences and market conditions involved in sustaining or inhibiting them.
Finally, as much as people care about the opinion others have of them, they care about their own self-
image. In the words of Adam Smith (1776), they make moral decisions by assessing their own conduct
through the eyes of an “impartial spectator”, an “ideal mate within the breast”:
“We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator
would examine it. If, upon placing ourselves in his situation, we thoroughly enter into all the passions
and motives which inﬂuenced it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the approbation of this supposed
equitable judge. If otherwise, we enter into his disapprobation, and condemn it.”
In more contemporary terms, psychologists and sociologists describe people’s behavior as being inﬂuenced
by a strong need to maintain conformity between one’s actions, or even feelings, and certain values, long-term
goals or identities they seek to uphold.3 Recent empirical studies conﬁrm the importance of such self-image
concerns and their contribution to prosocial behavior.4 A very telling experiment by Jason Dana, Jason
2 See, e.g., the studies reported in Glazer and Konrad (1996, p.1021). Note that anonymous contributions
have the same tax-deduction beneﬁts as nonanonymous ones.
3 Thus Batson (1998) writes that “The ability to pat oneself on the back and feeling god about being
a kind, caring person, can be a powerful incentive to help”; he also discusses the anticipation of guilt. Daniel
Kahneman and Jack Knetsch (1992) ﬁnd that subjects’ stated willingness to pay for alternative public goods is
well predicted by independent assessments of the associated “moral satisfaction”. Michèle Lamont (2000)
documents the importance attached by her interviewees to the presence or absence of the “caring self” not just
in others, but also in themselves.
4 For instance, in a transportation-related survey of about 1,300 individuals, Olof Johansson-Stenman and
Peter Martinsson (2003) ﬁnd that people who are asked which attributes in a car are most important to them
systematically put environmental performance near the top and social status near the bottom; but when asked
2Kuang, and Roberto Weber (2003) thus reveals that when people are given the opportunity to remain
ignorant of how their choices aﬀect others, or of their precise role in the outcome (as with ﬁring squads,
which always have one blank bullet), many “altruists” choose not to know and revert to selﬁsh choices.5
To examine this broad array of issues, we develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines hetero-
geneity in individuals’ degrees of altruism and greed with a concern for social reputation or self-respect. The
key property of the model is that agents’ pro- or anti-social behavior reﬂects an endogenous and unobservable
mix of three motivations: intrinsic, extrinsic, and reputational, which must be inferred from their choices
and the context. We obtain four main sets of results.
— Rewards and punishments. The presence of extrinsic incentives spoils the reputational value of good
deeds, creating doubt about the extent to which they were performed for the incentives rather than for
themselves. This is in line with what psychologists term the “overjustiﬁcation eﬀect” (e.g., Mark R. Lepper
et al. (1973)), to which we give here a formal content in terms of a signal-extraction problem.6 Rewards act
like an increase in the noise-to-signal ratio, or even reverse the sign of the signal, and the resulting crowding
out of the reputational (or self-image) motivation to contribute can make aggregate supply downward-sloping
over a wide range, with possibly a sharp drop at zero.
— Publicity and disclosure. The prominence and memorability of contributions strengthen the signaling
motive and thus generally encourage prosocial behavior. When individuals are heterogeneous in their image
concerns, however, a greater prominence also acts like an increase in the noise-to signal-ratio: good actions
become suspected of being motivated by appearances, which limits the eﬀectiveness of policies based on
“image rewards” such as praise and shame. The same concern can lead individuals to refrain from overtly
disclosing their good deeds and from turning down any rewards that are oﬀered. Sponsors may respond to
contributors’ desire to appear intrinsically rather than extrinsically motivated by publicly announcing low
rewards, but then ﬁnd it proﬁtable to oﬀer higher ones in private, creating a commitment problem.
about the true preferences of their neighbors or average compatriots, they give dramatically reversed rankings.
Interviews with car dealers show intermediate results.
5 In a related vein, J. Keith Murnighan et al. (2001) ﬁnd that the fairness of oﬀers in dictator games
is signiﬁcantly decreased when the precision with which oﬀerers can split the cake is decreased, allowing them
to construe the outcomes as largely outside their control.
6 It is also consistent with the informal explanation provided by Frey and Jegen (2001), namely that “An
intrinsically motivated person is deprived of the chance of displaying his or her own interest and involvement
in an activity when someone else oﬀers a reward, or orders him/her to do it”.
3— Spillovers and social norms. The inferences that can be drawn from a person’s actions depend on
what others choose to do, creating powerful spillovers that allow multiple norms of behavior to emerge as
equilibria. More generally, individuals’ decisions will be strategic complements or substitutes, depending on
whether their reputational concerns are (endogenously) dominated by the avoidance of stigma or the pursuit
of distinction. The ﬁrst case occurs when there are relatively few types with low intrinsic altruism and when
valid excuses for not contributing are more rare than events that make participation inevitable, or unusually
easy. The second case applies in the reverse circumstances.
—W e l f a r ea n dc o m p e t i t i o n . When setting rewards and publicizing contributions, sponsors will exploit
these complementarities or substitutabilities, which respectively increase or decrease the elasticity of the
supply curve. Because they do not internalize the reputational spillovers that fall on non-participants or on
those who contribute through other sponsors, however, their policies will generally be ineﬃcient. Thus, even
a monopoly sponsor may oﬀer rewards and “perks” (preferred seating, meetings with famous performers,
valuable social networking opportunities, naming rights to a building, stadium or professorial chair, etc.)
that are too generous from the point of view of social welfare, and sponsor competition may further aggravate
this ineﬃciency. The socially optimal incentive scheme, by contrast, subtracts from the standard Pigouvian
subsidy for public goods provision a “tax” on reputation-seeking, which, per se, is socially wasteful. In the
market for prosocial contributions, ﬁnally, a form of holier-than-thou competition can also lead sponsors
to oﬀer agents opportunities for reputationally motivated sacriﬁces that will again reduce social welfare,
without any increase in the supply of public goods..
While a number of related themes have been examined in the literature, none of the existing models
provides a uniﬁed account of this broad range of phenomena. Standard models of public goods provision
or altruistic behavior, whether based on a concern for others’ welfare, a pure joy of giving, or reciprocity,
are not consistent with a (locally) downward-sloping response of prosocial behavior to incentives, nor with
people choosing not to know how their actions will aﬀect others and reverting to selﬁsh behavior when such
ignorance is feasible. Models of giving as a signal of wealth explain monetary donations but not in-kind
prosocial acts such as volunteering, helping, giving blood, etc. (these should instead be avoided, as they
signal a low opportunity cost of time), the greater admiration reserved for anonymous contributions, or
people’s choosing to be modest about their good deeds. Models that postulate a reduced-form crowding out
4(or in) of intrinsic motivation by incentives do not really explain its source and miss its dependence on the
informational environment, such as the observability of actions and rewards or the distribution of preferences
in the population. The same is true for models of social norms that assume complementarities in payoﬀs.
The papers most closely related to the present one take a signaling approach to social interactions,
although none share with it the structure of multidimensional uncertainty that is essential to generating
overjustiﬁcation eﬀects and net crowding out. In Bénabou and Tirole (2003), a potential conﬂict between
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation arises from the fact giving an agent high-powered incentives may convey
bad news about the task or his ability. The idea that the principal has private information about these
variables applies well to child-rearing, education and empowerment versus monitoring of employees, but not
to activities such as contributing to a charitable cause, donating blood, voting, etc., which are our focus
here. In B. Douglas Bernheim (1994), individuals take actions designed to signal that their tastes lie close to
“the mainstream”, leading to conformity in behavior and multiple social norms. When reputation bears on
prosocial orientation, however, what is valuable is not to resemble the average but to appear as altruistic as
possible. Such is the case in Corneo’s (1997) signaling model of union membership, with which our analysis
of social norms shares some important insights. On the other hand, Corneo’s model does not give rise to
crowding out, and while Bernheim does not consider the eﬀects of incentives, the similarly unidimensional
structure of his model will also lead to a standard upward-sloping response. Jerker Denrell (1998) shows how
the presence of monetary or side beneﬁts in some activity can destroy the separating equilibrium that would
otherwise obtain. While this again does not lead to crowding out, a principal may obtain higher proﬁts
with a zero reward than with a positive one. Closest to our paper is that of Paul Seabright (2002), where
individuals derive from participating in a “civic activity” both a direct beneﬁtt h a td e p e n d so nt h e i rp r i v a t e
type and a reputation that will make them more desirable partners in a later matching market. Under a
sorting condition that makes high types care more about reputation, a “payment” discontinuity arises at
zero, in that total participation can be greater when no reward is oﬀered than with a small positive one.7
7 Our paper naturally also ties in to the large literature on gifts and donations, such as James Andreoni
(1993) Amihai Glazer and Kai A. Konrad (1996), William Harbaugh (1998), Andrea Buraschi and Francesca
Cornelli (2002) and Prendergast and Lars A. Stole (2001). Other related papers include Bodner and Prelec
(2003) and Bénabou and Tirole (2004a) on self-signaling, Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton (2000) on identity,
Kjell Arne Brekke, Snorre Kverndokk, and Karine Nyborg (2003) on moral motivation, Maarten Janssen and
Ewa Mendys-Kamphorst (2004) on rewards and the evolution of social norms, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
(1995) and Laurie Simon Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) on ostentatious consumptions as signaling devices.
5The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the model and an intuitive illustration of the image-
spoiling eﬀect of rewards. Section II formally demonstrates the crowding-out phenomenon, as well as a
related form of the overjustiﬁcation eﬀect. Section III deals with social norms and more generally identiﬁes
the features of the market that make individual decisions strategic complements or substitutes. Section IV
explores issues of conﬁdentiality and disclosure with respect to rewards or actions. Section V examines the
setting of incentives by public or private sponsors and the eﬀects of competition on social welfare. Section
VI concludes with possible directions for further research. All proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
I. The Model
A. Preferences and information
We study the behavior of agents who choose the extent of their participation in some prosocial activity:
contributing to a public good or worthy cause, engaging in a friendly action, refraining from imposing
negative externalities on others, etc. Each selects a participation level a from some choice set A ⊂ R that
can be discrete (voting, blood donation) or continuous (time or money volunteered, fuel eﬃciency of car
purchased). Choosing a entails a utility cost C(a) and yields a monetary or other material reward ya. The
incentive rate y ≷ 0 may reﬂect a proportional subsidy or tax faced by agents in this economy, or the fact
that participation requires a monetary contribution. It is set by a principal or “sponsor” and, for now,
individuals take it as given.
Denoting by va and vy an agent’s intrinsic valuations for contributing to the social good and for money
(consumption of market goods), participation at level a yields a direct beneﬁt
(va + vyy)a − C(a). (1)
Each individual’s preference type or “identity” v ≡ (va,v y) ∈ R2 is drawn independently from a continuous
distribution with density f (v), marginal densities g(va) and h(vy) and mean (¯ va, ¯ vy). Its realization is
private information, known to the agent when he acts but not observable by others.
Social signaling. In addition to these direct payoﬀs, decisions carry reputational costs and beneﬁts,
Our work is also technically related to a recent literature on signals that convey diverging news about
diﬀerent underlying characteristics (Aloisio Pessoa de Araújo et al. (2004), Philipp Sadowski (2004), David
Austen-Smith and Roland G. Fryer (2005)).
6reﬂecting the judgements and reactions of others —family, friends, colleagues, employers. The value of
reputation can be instrumental (making the agent a more attractive match, as in Denrell (1998), Herbert
Gintis et al. (2001) or Seabright (2002)) or purely hedonic (social esteem as a consumption good). For
simplicity, we assume that it depends linearly on observers’ posterior expectations of the agent’s type v, so
that the reputational payoﬀ from choosing a, given an incentive rate y is
R(a,y) ≡ x
£
γaE (va|a,y) − γyE (vy|a,y)
¤
, with γa ≥ 0 and γy ≥ 0.8 (2)
The signs of γa and γy reﬂect the idea that people would like to appear as prosocial (public-spirited)
and disinterested (not greedy), while the factor x>0 measures the visibility or salience of their actions:
probability that it will be observed by others, number of people who will hear about it, length of time during
which the record will be kept, etc. Deﬁning µa ≡ xγa and µy ≡ xγy, an agent with preferences v ≡ (va,v y)
and reputational concerns µ ≡
¡
µa,µ y
¢
thus solves
max
a∈A
©
(va + vyy)a − C(a)+µaE (va|a,y) − µyE (vy|a,y)
ª
. (3)
In the basic version of the model, µ is taken to be common to all agents and thus public knowledge. In the full
version we also allow for unobserved heterogeneity in image-consciousness, with µ distributed independently
of v a c c o r d i n gt oad e n s i t ym(µ). Note, ﬁnally, that while we shall generally cast the analysis in terms of
eﬀortful or time-consuming prosocial actions such as volunteering, voting, etc., it is equally applicable to
purely monetary (e.g., charitable) donations.9
Self-signaling and identity. The model admits an important reinterpretation in terms of self-image.
Suppose that, at the time he makes his decision, the individual engages in a self-assessment or receives
8 This payoﬀ is deﬁned net of the constant (1 − x)
¡
γa¯ va − γy¯ vy
¢
, which corresponds to the case where
a remains unobserved. Note that a value of reputation that is a linear functional of the posterior distribution
over the agent’s type (such as its expectation) avoids building into his preferences either information-aversion
(concave functional) or information-loving (convex functional). The more restrictive assumption, which
we make for tractability, is that the coeﬃcients in (2) are independent of the agent’s type v.
9 Let a now be the number of dollars contributed by an individual with a known, concave utility over
income, represented by the term −C(a). Each dollar generates one unit of public good and entitles the
contributor to y units of perks and privileges (meeting with performers, gala events, networking, etc.),
a “currency” for which he has utility vy. This alternative interpretation of (3) is fully consistent with
the analysis in Section II. One can also capture the case where instead of perks, the sponsor oﬀers a matching
rate y : let vy ≡ 1 and C(a)=ca, where c is the cost of providing a unit of public good, so the net
cost to the contributor is only c−y. This corresponds to the speciﬁcation of (3) used in most of Sections III-V.
7some external signal about his type: “How important is it for me to contribute to the public good? How
much do I care about money? What are my real values?” This information, however, may not be perfectly
recalled or “accessible” later on —in fact, there will often be strong incentives to remember it in a self-serving
way. Actions, by contrast, are much easier to encode and remember than the underlying motives, making it
rational to deﬁne oneself partly through ones’ past choices: “I am the kind of person who behaves in this
way”. Suppose therefore that the feelings or signal motivating the participation decision are forgotten with
some probability proportional to x and that, later on, the agent cares about “what kind of a person he is”.10
If, for simplicity, this utility from self-image is linear in beliefs, with weights γa and −γy on perceived social
orientation and greediness, the model is formally equivalent to the social-signaling one.
Relation to altruism and public goods. An agent’s intrinsic motivation to behave prosocially, va, can stem
from two sources. First, he may care about the overall level of a public good to which his action contributes
but that is enjoyed by others as well, such air quality. Let this component of utility be wa (n¯ a/nκ), where
¯ a represents the average contribution, n t h es i z eo ft h eg r o u pa n dκ ≥ 0 the degree of congestion; wa then
measures the intensity of the individual’s “pure” altruism.11 Second, he may experience a “joy of giving”
ua (independent of social- or self-esteem concerns) that makes him value his own contribution to ¯ a more
than someone else’s.12 Combining these “pure” and “impure” forms of altruism (Andreoni (1988)) yields
va = ua + wa/nκ; in large groups with κ>0, the second term vanishes. The simplest interpretation of our
model is thus one where there is a unit continuum of agents, so that va = ua, but where κ =1so that the
average contribution still generates a public good, which individuals value as wa¯ a. The model applies equally
well to ﬁnite groups of any size n and value κ, however. All that matters is that there be heterogeneity
10 This may reﬂect a hedonic motive (people enjoy feeling generous or disinterested, e.g. Akerlof and Dickens
(1982) or Botond Köszegi (2000)), an instrumental purpose (providing motivation to undertake and persevere
in long-term tasks or social relationships, e.g. Juan D. Carrillo and Thomas Mariotti (2000) or Bénabou and
Tirole (2002)), or both. The idea that individuals take their actions as diagnostic of their preferences
originated in psychology with Daryl J. Bem (1972) and relates closely to cognitive dissonance theory (Leon
Festinger and James Carlsmith (1959)). The link between imperfect recall and intertemporal self-signaling
is analyzed in Bénabou and Tirole (2004a), while Bodner and Prelec (2003) examine contemporaneous
self-signaling in a split-self model.
11 At the cost of some additional complexity, one could make agents care about social welfare (which
is then deﬁned as a ﬁxed point) rather than about the level of the public good per se.
12 Such would be the eﬀect of feelings of empathy (emphasized by Batson (1998)) or reciprocity. Equivalently,
the marginal cost of participation may include an individual component equal to −ua. The term ua could also
arise from agents’ following the Kantian imperative to evaluate their actions as if they would lead everyone to
make those same choices (Brekke et al. (2003)).
8in the intrinsic propensity to contribute or reciprocate, va, no matter its source, and that agents value
being perceived, or perceiving themselves, as having a high va. This (self) esteem beneﬁt, µaE (va|a,y), is
perhaps what corresponds best to the idea of a “warm glow” of giving: gaining social approval, feeling good
about oneself, etc. Finally, note that the action a chosen by agents and giving rise to reputation could be
their reaction to someone else’s behavior, such as cooperation or defection. The model is thus applicable to
reciprocity as well as to unconditional prosocial behavior.
We now turn to the terms in (3) relating to material compensation. That in vyy requires no explanation,
except to note that if the individual believes that his receiving y reduces the resources available to the sponsor
for supporting other activities he cares about, it will be attenuated by an “eviction eﬀect”.13 Consider next
the potential negative reputation attached to “greed” or money-orientation, −µyE (vy|a,y). Note ﬁrst that
all the paper’s results but one (Proposition 3) obtain with µy ≡ 0 as well. It is nonetheless natural to allow
f o rs u c ha ne ﬀect —“greedy” is no compliment. Someone who has a high valuation for money relative to
eﬀort and / or public goods is not a very attractive partner in friendship, marriage, hiring to a position
of responsibility, electing to oﬃce and other situations where it is diﬃcult to always monitor behavior or
write complete contracts. Demonstrating a low marginal utility for money vy can also be valuable because
it signals high wealth, a motive that ﬁgures prominently in the literatures on charitable contributions and
on conspicuous consumptions (e.g., Glazer and Conrad (1996), Bagwell and Bernheim (1996)).
B . T h ei m a g e - s p o i l i n ge ﬀect of rewards: basic insights
We begin with an intuitive presentation of some key mechanisms. Consider the ﬁrst-order condition for
an agent’s choice of a, assuming a well-behaved decision problem over a continuous choice set. By (3), an
individual with type (v, µ) who faces a price y equates
C0(a)=va + vyy + r(a,y;µ), (4)
13 In experiments on charitable giving (e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b)), it is typically emphasized
to subjects that any rewards will come from an entirely separate research budget and therefore not reduce
the amount actually donated. In the real world, the presence and magnitude of an eviction eﬀect will
depend on individuals’ beliefs about the level at which the budget constraint binds and how they value
the alternative uses of funds. Suppose, for instance, that a charity has a ﬁxed budget and will use any
funds left over to hire “professionals” who produce τ units of a per dollar, or some other public good of
equivalent value. An individuals’ valuation of a reward y for his contribution will now be (vy −τwa/nα)y.This
simply amounts to a redeﬁnition of vy, in a way that contributes to making it negatively correlated with va.
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Figure 1: the eﬀects of rewards on the pool of participants
where the last term is his (marginal) reputational return from contributing at level a :
r(a,y;µ) ≡ µa
∂E(va|a,y)
∂a
− µy
∂E(vy|a,y)
∂a
. (5)
Three important points are apparent from (4). First, observing someone’s choice of a reveals the sum of his
three motivations to contribute (at the margin): intrinsic, extrinsic, and reputational. In general all three
vary across people, so that learning about va or vy corresponds to a signal-extraction problem. Second, a
higher incentive rate y will reduce the informativeness of actions about va, and the converse for vy. Third,
heterogeneity in agents’ image concerns µ represents an additional source of noise that makes inferences
about both va and vy less reliable, and that is ampliﬁed when actions become more visible (higher x).
To gain further insight into the impact of incentives on inferences and behavior, let us now focus on the
benchmark case where va and vy are independent random variables, while µa and µy are ﬁxed and omitted
from the notation. Figure 1 then shows, for any a>0, how the set of agents who contribute at least a varies
with the reward y. This group, which we shall term “high contributors”, comprises all agents with
va + vyy ≥ C0(a) − r(a,y), (6)
so its boundary is a straight line corresponding to (4), along which agents choose exactly a. The same
condition applies when the participation decision is discrete, a ∈ {0,1}, as will be the case in the second half
of the paper, provided we denote C0(1) ≡ C(1) − C(0) and r(1,y) ≡ R(1,y) − R(0,y). Along the boundary,
agents are now indiﬀerent between participating and abstaining.
When no reward is oﬀered, y =0 , the separating locus is vertical: an agent’s contribution reveals nothing
10about his vy, but is very informative about his va. In the continuous case prosocial orientation is learned
perfectly, in the discrete case one learns whether it is above or below a known cutoﬀ.
When a reward y>0 is introduced, the slope of the separating locus becomes −1/y < 0. If we ignore,
in a ﬁrst step, any changes in the inferences embodied in the intercept, the original boundary simply pivots
to the left, as shown in Figure 1 (everything works symmetrically for a ﬁne or penalty, y<0). The set of
agents contributing at least a thus expands, as types in the hatched area (A + B) are drawn in. Since this
occurs at every level of a, the distribution of contributions shifts up (stochastically), resulting in a higher
total supply; this is the standard eﬀect of incentives. In equilibrium, however, there are two reputational
eﬀects:
a) The new members of the high-contributors’ club have lower va’s than the old ones, so they drag down
the group’s reputation for prosocial orientation. The reputation of the low-contributors’ group also declines,
however, so in the discrete-choice case the net eﬀect on the reputational incentive to participate can clearly
go either way. Similarly, in the continuous case the reputation E (va|a,y) attached to contributing exactly
a declines (as that locus pivots to the left), but so does the reputation attached to contributing exactly
a0 = a−da, where da is small; the eﬀect on the marginal return ∂E(va|a,y)/∂a is thus generally ambiguous.
b) The new high contributors are “greedy” types (have a vy above the mean), whereas those who still
contribute below a after the reward is introduced reveal that they care less about money than average.
This unambiguously reduces the reputational incentive to participate, as is clear in the discrete case. In the
continuous case this follows from the fact that, after the rotation, the locus for contributing at a − da lies
below that for contributing a.14
If the overall impact of these changes in inferences is negative, r(a,y) <r (a,0), as drawn in Figure 1, the
reward attracts some new participants (more greedy agents in area B) to contributing a or more, but repels
some existing ones (more public-spirited agents in area C). This matches precisely William Upton’s (1973)
ﬁndings that oﬀering a monetary reward for giving blood led to reduced donations by those who had regularly
been giving for free and increased donations from those who never had. Overall, the number of agents who
contribute at least a may increase or decrease, depending on the weights given to B and C by the distribution
f(v). If a net decrease occurs at every a, the distribution of contributions shifts down (stochastically) and
14 This is due to the fact that C0(a) − r(a,y) is increasing in a, by the second-order condition for (3).
11total supply actually declines when a reward y>0 is introduced, starting from a no-reward situation.
II. The overjustiﬁcation eﬀect and crowding out
We now turn to the formal analysis, establishing three main results. First, we show how the “overjustiﬁ-
cation eﬀect” discussed by psychologists can be understood as a signal-extraction problem in which rewards
amplify the noise, leading observers (or a retrospecting individual) to attribute less of role to intrinsic moti-
vation in explaining variations in behavior. We then identify the conditions under which monetary incentives
crowd out reputational motivation, resulting in a supply curve that is downward-sloping over a potentially
wide range, or exhibits a sharp drop at zero. Finally, we assess the eﬀectiveness of non-material rewards
such as praise and shame, showing in particular that it is also limited by a form of overjustiﬁcation eﬀect.
We use here a speciﬁcation of the model that builds on the familiar normal-learning setup. Let actions
vary continuously over A = R, with cost C(a)=ka2/2.15
⎛
⎜
⎝
va
vy
⎞
⎟
⎠ ∼ N
⎛
⎜
⎝
¯ va
¯ vy
,
⎡
⎢
⎣
σ2
a σay
σay σ2
y
⎤
⎥
⎦
⎞
⎟
⎠, ¯ va ≷ 0, ¯ vy > 0, (7)
and at ﬁrst we continue to focus on the case where everyone has the same reputational concerns, µ ≡ (¯ µa, ¯ µy).
We then extend the analysis to the case where µ is also normally distributed across individuals.16
A. Material rewards
With ﬁxed µ’s, the reputational return (5) is constant across agents and equal to
¯ r(a,y) ≡ ¯ µa
∂E(va|a,y)
∂a
− ¯ µy
∂E(vy|a,y)
∂a
. (8)
Thus, by (4), an agent’s choice of a reveals his va+yvy, equal to C0(a)−¯ r(a,y). Standard results for normal
random variables then yield
15 The case of a general convex function C(a) is treated in Bénabou and Tirole (2004b). Both here and there,
we focus attention on equilibria in which the reputation vector, E (v|a,y), is diﬀerentiable in a. .
16 As is often the case, normality yields great tractability at the cost of allowing certain variables to take
implausible negative values. By choosing the relevant means large enough, however, one can make the
probability of such realizations arbitrarily small; but (7) and (17) below should really be interpreted as
local approximations, consistent with the linearity of preferences assumed throughout the paper.
12E (va|a,y)=¯ va + ρ(y) · (ka− ¯ va − ¯ vy y − ¯ r(a,y)) (9)
E (vy|a,y)=¯ vy + χ(y) · (ka− ¯ va − ¯ vy y − ¯ r(a,y)), (10)
where
ρ(y) ≡
σ2
a + yσay
σ2
a +2 yσay + y2σ2
y
and yχ(y) ≡ 1 − ρ(y). (11)
Intuitively, the posterior assessment of an agent’s intrinsic motivation, E (va|a,y), is a weighted average
of the prior ¯ va and of the marginal cost of his observed contribution, net of the average extrinsic and
reputational incentives to contribute at that level.
Finally, substituting (8) into (9)-(10) shows that an equilibrium corresponds to a pair of functions
E (va|a,y) and E (vy|a,y) that solve a system of two linear diﬀerential equations.
Proposition 1 Let all agents have the same image concern (¯ µa, ¯ µy). There is a unique (diﬀerentiable-
reputation) equilibrium, in which an agent with preferences (va,v y) contributes at the level
a =
va + vy y
k
+¯ µaρ(y) − ¯ µyχ(y), (12)
where ρ(y) and χ(y) are deﬁned by (11). The reputational returns are ∂E(vy|a,y)/∂a = ρ(y)k and ∂E(vy|a,y)
/∂a = χ(y)k, resulting in a net value ¯ r(y)=k
¡
¯ µaρ(y) − ¯ µyχ(y)
¢
.
The eﬀects of extrinsic incentives on inferences and behaviors can now be analyzed. While a higher y
increases agents’ direct payoﬀ from contributing, va + vy y, it also tends to reduce the associated signaling
value along both dimensions. In the benchmark case of no correlation (σay =0 ) , for instance,
ρ(y)=
1
1+y2σ2
y/σ2
a
and χ(y) ≡
yσ2
y/σ2
a
1+y2σ2
y/σ2
a
, (13)
s oah i g h e ry acts much like an increase in the noise-to-signal ratio θ ≡ σy/σa, leading observers who
parse out the agent’s motives to decrease the weight attributed to social orientation, ρ(y), and increase its
counterpart for greediness, χ(y).17 When σay 6=0 , a positive correlation tends to amplify the decline in ρ(y),
an e g a t i v eo n ew o r k st ow e a k e ni t . 18 Indeed, the more va and vy tend to move together, the less observing
17 More precisely, yχ(y)=1−ρ(y) rises with y everywhere, but the same is true of χ(y) only for |y| ≤ 1/θ.
18 For instance, as the correlation between va and vy rises from −1 to 0 to 1, the function ρ(y) pivots
downwards over the range 0 <y<1/θ ,f r o m1/(1−θy) to 1/(1+θ
2y2) a n dt h e nt o1/(1+θy). The eﬀect of σay
on the slope χ0(y) is more complex, as it depends on σ2
ay; the formula is provided in the Appendix.
13a high contribution a, or equivalently a high va + vyy, represents good news about the agent’s intrinsic
valuation va; and the larger is y, the stronger is this “discounting” eﬀect.
Summing (12) over agents yields the (per capita) aggregate supply of the public good ¯ a(y), whose slope,
¯ a0(y)=
¯ vy
k
+¯ µaρ0(y) − ¯ µyχ0(y), (14)
reﬂects both the standard eﬀect of incentives and the crowding out or in of reputational motivation that they
induce. Since the general expression (provided in the appendix) is a bit complicated, we focus here on two
benchmark cases that make clear the main factors at play. The ﬁrst one is that of independent values, for
which we show that as long as the reputational concern over either prosocial orientation or money-orientation
is above some minimum level, there exists a range over which incentives backﬁre.
Proposition 2 (overjustiﬁcation and crowding out). Let σay =0and deﬁne θ ≡ σy/σa. Incentives
are counterproductive, ¯ a0(y) < 0, at all levels such that
¯ vy
k
< ¯ µa ·
2yθ
2
¡
1+y2θ
2¢2 +¯ µy ·
θ
2 ¡
1 − y2θ
2¢
¡
1+y2θ
2¢2 . (15)
Consequently, for all ¯ µa above some threshold µ∗
a ≥ 0 there exists a range [y1,y 2] such that ¯ a(y) is decreasing
on [y1,y 2] and increasing elsewhere on R. If ¯ µy < ¯ vy/kθ, then µ∗
a > 0 and 0 <y 1 <y 2; as ¯ µa increases, y1
rises and y2 falls, so [y1,y 2] widens. If ¯ µy > ¯ vy/kθ
2, then µ∗
a =0and y1 < 0 <y 2; as ¯ µa increases both y1
and y2 rise and, for ¯ µa large enough, [y1,y 2] again widens.
The role of ¯ µa is illustrated in Figure 2a. Crowding out can occur over a fairly wide range, making all
but very large rewards inferior to none.19
The second case we highlight is that of “small rewards”, which is interesting for two reasons. First, some
studies ﬁnd crowding out (¯ a(y) decreasing) to occur mostly at relatively low levels, and it is sometimes even
suggested that the main eﬀect is a discontinuity at zero in subjects’ response to incentives (Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000b), Gneezy (2003)). Is there something qualitatively diﬀerent between “unrewarded” and
“rewarded” activities that could cause rational agents to behave in this way? We show that there is, and
explain when it will matter. The second reason why “small rewards” are of interest is that in real-world
19 The values used in Figure 2a are ¯ va =4 ,v y =1 ,µ y =0 ,θ= .2 and µa ∈ {0,6.7, 8.3,10,12,14.6}. In Figure
2b they are ¯ va =3 , ¯ vy =1 ,µ a = µy =1and θ ∈ {0,1,2,3,5}.
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situations where time has an opportunity cost, they will actually correspond to substantial values of y.
Proposition 3 (small net incentives and signal-reversal). (1) Small rewards or punishments are
counterproductive, ¯ a0(0) < 0, whenever
¯ vy
k
< ¯ µa
µ
σay
σ2
a
¶
+¯ µy
Ã
σ2
y − 2σ2
ay/σ2
a
σ2
a
!
. (16)
(2) Let ¯ µy > 0 and assume that va and vy are uncorrelated, or more generally not too correlated. Then, as
σa/σy becomes small, the slope of the supply function at y =0tends to −∞.
(3) Suppose that participation entails a unit opportunity cost with monetary value ˆ y. Then ¯ a0(ˆ y) < 0 and
¯ a0(ˆ y) →− ∞under the conditions stated in (1) and (2) respectively.
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (16) reﬂects the intuition given earlier about the role of correlation
in generating crowding out -or in. Most important is the second term, whose dependence on the noise-to-
signal ratio is illustrated in Figure 2b: letting σay =0 , for instance, shows that ¯ a0(0) = ¯ vy/k − ¯ µy(σy/σa)2.
Thus, when individuals’ desire for money becomes much more uncertain (to observers) than their motivation
for the speciﬁc task at hand, and even if they have only a minimal concern about appearing greedy (¯ µy
is small), the supply response becomes discontinuous (downward) at zero. The intuition for why “zero is
special” is that, at that point, participation switches from being an “unproﬁtable” to a “proﬁtable” activity
and thus comes to be interpreted as a signal of greed rather than disinterestedness. This signal reversal
eﬀect, operating speciﬁcally around a zero net reward, creates an additional source of crowding out on top
15of the general signal-jamming eﬀect (decrease in ρ(y)) that was shown to operate at all levels of y.20
If the empirical validity of this signal reversal was restricted to very small prizes and ﬁnes, it would be of
somewhat limited interest. The third result, shows, however, that the relevant “tipping point” is not really
zero (except in laboratory experiments, where subjects, once there, have no proﬁtable alternative uses of
their time) but agents’ monetary value of time, which can be quite substantial.
B. Image rewards
Public authorities and private sponsors aiming to foster prosocial behavior make heavy use of both public
displays and private mementos conveying honor or shame. Nations award medals and honoriﬁc titles, char-
itable organizations send donors pictures of “their” sponsored child, non-proﬁts give bumper stickers and
T-shirts with logos, universities award honorary “degrees” to scholars, etc. Conversely, the ancient practice
of the pillory has been updated in the form of televised arrests and publishing the names of parents who
are delinquent on child support, or the licence plate numbers of cars photographed in areas known for drug
traﬃcking or prostitution. Peer groups also play an important role by creating a rehearsal mechanism: if
acquaintances all contribute to a cause, one is constantly reminded of one’s generosity, or lack thereof.21
Formally, greater publicity or prominence corresponds to a homothetic increase in (µa,µ y). Our model
then conﬁrms the above intuitions, but also delivers important caveats. In particular, when agents are
heterogeneous in their reputational concerns, giving greater scrutiny to their behavior may not work that
well, as good actions come to be suspected of being image-motivated. To analyze these issues we now allow
agents’ image concerns, like their valuations, to be normally distributed:
⎛
⎜
⎝
µa
µy
⎞
⎟
⎠ ∼ N
⎛
⎜
⎝
¯ µa
¯ µy
,
⎡
⎢
⎣
ω2
a ωay
ωay ω2
y
⎤
⎥
⎦
⎞
⎟
⎠, ¯ µa ≥ 0, ¯ µy ≥ 0, (17)
with v and µ independent. In the ﬁrst-order condition (4), the reputational return r(a,y;µ) is now also
normal and independent of v (conditionally on a), with mean ¯ r(a,y) given by (8) and variance
20 When the two eﬀects are combined it is easy to get supply curves that have a sharp local minimum
at y =0 , so that neither oﬀering rewards (up to a point) nor requiring sacriﬁces raises supply.
21 People indeed volunteer more help in response to a request to do so, especially when it comes from
a friend, a colleague or family (Freeman 1997), whose opinion of them they naturally care about more
than that of strangers.
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µ
∂E(va|a,y)
∂a −
∂E(vy|a,y)
∂a
¶
⎡
⎢
⎣
ω2
a ωay
ωay ω2
y
⎤
⎥
⎦
⎛
⎜
⎝
∂E(va|a,y)
∂a
−
∂E(vy|a,y)
∂a
⎞
⎟
⎠. (18)
The signal-extraction formulas (9)-(10) thus remain unchanged, except that the updating coeﬃcients ρ(y)
and χ(y) are respectively replaced by
ρ(a,y) ≡
σ2
a + yσay
σ2
a +2 yσay + y2σ2
y + Ω(a,y)2 and χ(a,y) ≡
yσ2
y + σay
σ2
a +2 yσay + y2σ2
y + Ω(a,y)2. (19)
An equilibrium then corresponds again to a pair of functions E (va|a,y) and E (vy|a,y) that solve the
diﬀerential equations (9)-(10), but this system is now nonlinear, due to the term Ω(a,y)2 in ρ and χ. We
are able to solve it for the intuitive and important class of solutions where Ω is independent of a, so that
reputations remain linear in a. We cannot a priori exclude the existence of other, nonlinear, equilibria.
Proposition 4 (1) A linear-reputation equilibrium corresponds to a ﬁxed-point Ω(y), solution to:
Ω(y)2/k2 ≡ ω2
a ρ(y)2 − 2ωay ρ(y)χ(y)+ω2
y χ(y)2, (20)
where ρ(y) and χ(y) are given by (19)w i t hΩ(a,y) ≡ Ω(y). The optimal action chosen by an agent with type
(v,µ) is then
a =
va + y · vy
k
+ µaρ(y) − µyχ(y) (21)
and the marginal reputations are ∂E(va|a,y)/∂a = ρ(y)k and ∂E(vy|a,y)/∂a = χ(y)k, with a net value of
r(y;µ)=( µaρ(y) − µyχ(y))k for the agent.
(2) There always exists such an equilibrium, and if ωay =0it is unique (in the linear-reputation class).
A greater variability of image motives, Ω(y)2 = Va r(r(y;µ)), makes individuals’ behavior a more noisy
measure of their true underlying values (va,v y), reducing both ρ(y) and χ(y). This variance is itself en-
dogenous, however, as agents’ reputational calculus takes into account how their collective behavior aﬀects
observers’ signal-extraction-problem. This is reﬂected in the ﬁxed-point nature of equation (20).22
Proposition 4 also allows us to demonstrate how increased publicity gives rise to an oﬀsetting overjustiﬁ-
cation eﬀect. Let all the reputational weights µ =( µa,µ y) be scaled up by some prominence or memorability
22 When ωay 6=0there could be multiple equilibria, with diﬀerent degrees of informativeness. Since the
general theme of multiplicity is investigated in Section III.A, we do not pursue it here.
17factor,x; the material incentive y remains constant. Aggregate supply is now
¯ a(y,x)=
¯ va + y · ¯ vy
k
+ x
¡
¯ µaρ(y,x) − ¯ µyχ(y,x)
¢
, (22)
where the dependence on x indicates that all the covariance terms
¡
ω2
a,ωay,ω2
y
¢
in the original equation
(20), corresponding to x =1 , are now multiplied by x2. A greater visibility of actions (and of any rewards
attached to them) thus has two oﬀsetting eﬀects on the reputational incentive to contribute:
a) a direct amplifying eﬀect, the sign of which is that of µaρ(y,x) − µyχ(y,x) for an individual and
¯ µaρ(y,x)−¯ µyχ(y,x) on average. For people who are mostly concerned about appearing socially-minded (µa
À µy) this increases the incentive to act in a prosocial manner, whereas for those most concerned about not
appearing greedy (µy À µa) it has the reverse eﬀect.23
b) a dampening eﬀect, as reputation becomes less sensitive to the individual’s behavior, which observers
increasingly ascribe to image concerns. Formally, the “eﬀective noise” Ω(y,x) increases with x (in any stable
equilibrium) and ρ(y,x) and χ(y,x) consequently tend to decrease with it.
This tradeoﬀ implies that giving increased publicity to pro- or anti-social behavior may be of somewhat
limited eﬀectiveness, even when it is relatively cheap to do. Consider for instance the case where µy is known
(ωy =0 ) , possibly equal to zero. As x becomes large (more generally, xkω2
a >> 1), equation (20) yields
ρ(y,x) ≈
µ
σ2
a + yσay
k2ω2
a
¶1/3
x−2/3. (23)
The aggregate social beneﬁt from publicity ¯ µaxρ(y,x) thus grows only as x1/3, implying that it is optimal
to provide only a ﬁnite level of x even when it has a constant marginal cost, or even a marginal cost that
declines slower than x−2/3.24 Policies by parents, teachers, governments and other principals that rely on
the “currency ” of praise and shame are thus eﬀective up to a point, but eventually self-limiting.
III. Honor, stigma, and social norms
The second main issue we explore is that of social and personal norms. We ﬁrst show how multiple
23 We are focussing this discussion, for simplicity, on the “natural” case where ρ and χ are both positive,
w h i c ho c c u r sa sl o n ga sσay is not too negative; see (19).
24 On the other hand there cannot be full crowding out, namely xρ(y,x) actually decreasing with x :
otherwise, by (19) and (20) ρ(y,x) would be increasing in x, a contradiction.
18standards of “acceptable” behavior can arise from the interplay of honor and shame, then examine what
characteristics of the “market”, such as the distribution of social preferences, the availability of excuses or
the observability of action and inaction, facilitate or impede their emergence.
For the remainder of the paper we focus on the case of a binary participation decision, A = {0,1}, in
which the notions of honor and stigma are most sharply apparent. Unless otherwise speciﬁed (Sections
IV.B and IV.C) we also assume that all agents share the same reputational concern µ ≡ (µa,µ y) and
the same valuation for money, which we normalize to vy ≡ 1. Their prosocial orientation va, by contrast,
is distributed on some interval [v−
a ,v+
a ].25 Indeed, whereas two-dimensional uncertainty is essential to the
overjustiﬁcation and backﬁring-incentives eﬀects analyzed earlier, it is not needed for most of the other
results. This simpliﬁcation also removes any potential incentive for agents to “burn money” in order to
signal a low vy.
We again denote r(y) ≡ R(1,y) − R(0,y) and let c ≡ C(1) − C(0). Thus, an agent now participates if
va ≥ c−y−r(y) ≡ v∗
a(y). To determine the equilibrium threshold of altruism let us deﬁne, for any candidate
cutoﬀ va, the conditional means in the upper and lower tails:
M− (va) ≡ E (˜ va |˜ va ≤ va), (24)
M+ (va) ≡ E (˜ va |˜ va ≥ va) . (25)
The ﬁrst expression governs the “honor” conferred by participation, which is the diﬀerence between M+ (va)
and the unconditional mean ¯ va. The second one governs the “stigma” from abstention, which is ¯ va−M(va).
Since both are nondecreasing functions, the net reputational gain M+ (va) − M− (va) and the marginal
agent’s total non-monetary return to contributing,
Ψ(va) ≡ va + µa
£
M+ (va) − M− (va)
¤
≡ va + ∆(va), (26)
may increase or decrease with overall participation, [va,v+
a ]. The slopes of these two functions will play
central roles in what follows.26
25 T h er e s u l t sg e n e r a l i z et ot h ec a s ew h e r eva and vy are independently distributed and reputation bears only
on the former (µy =0 ) .
26 Recall also that, in the discussion of Figure 1, it was argued that the reputation for prosociality of
contributors may worsen either more or less than that of non-contributors when the separating locus pivots to
the left due to the presence of a reward y>0. Indeed, for any given value of vy (over which one then
19A. Endogenous social norms
What makes a given behavior socially or morally unacceptable is often the very fact that “it is just not
done”, meaning that only people whose extreme types make them social outliers would not be dissuaded by
the intense shame attached to it. In other places or times diﬀerent norms or codes of honor prevail, and
the fact that “everyone does it” allows the very same behavior to be free of all stigma. Examples include
choosing surrender over death, not going to church, not voting, divorce, bankruptcy, unemployment, welfare
dependency, minor tax evasion, and conspicuous modes of consumption.
We show here that such interdependencies between agents’ choices arise endogenously through the infer-
ences made from observed behaviors, creating the potential for multiple norms of social responsibility. In
particular, no assumption of complementarity in payoﬀs (e.g., between va and the average contribution ¯ a,
representing a form of “reciprocity”) is required to explain the common ﬁnding that individuals contribute
more to public goods when they know that others are also giving more.27
Proposition 5 (1) When Ψ is increasing, there is a unique equilibrium, which varies with y as described
in Figure 3a.
(2) When Ψ is decreasing, the equilibrium set varies with y as described in Figure 3b. Thus, for all y ∈
(c − Ψ(v−
a ),c− Ψ(v+
a )), there are three equilibria: v∗
a = v−
a (full participation), v∗
a = v+
a (no participation)
and an interior one deﬁned by Ψ(v∗
a)=c − y that is unstable (in the usual tâtonnement sense).
(3) When Ψ is non-monotonic, there exists a range of values of y for which there are at least two stable
equilibria, of which one at least is interior.
We provide two examples. When va is uniformly distributed on [0,1], Ψ(va)=va + µa/2 so the supply
curve is a familiar, upward-sloping one, as in Figure 3a. When va has density g(va)=2 va on [0,1], by
contrast, Ψ(va)=va +( 2 µa/3)(1 + va)
−1 is decreasing for all µa > 6, resulting in three equilibria as in
Figure 3b. For µa ∈ (3/2,6), Ψ is hump-shaped, making the high-participation equilibrium interior.
integrates), these reputations respectively correspond to M+ (v∗
a − vyy) and M− (v∗
a − vyy), whose diﬀerence
may increase or decrease with y depending on the slope of M+ − M−.
27 For instance, James H. Bryan, and M.A. Test (1967) found that motorists were more likely to stop and help
someone with a ﬂat tire, and walkers-by more likely to put money into a Salvation Army kettle, when
they had observed earlier someone else (a confederate) doing so a few minutes before. See also Jan Potters,
Martin Sefton and Lise Vesterlund (2001) on charities’ frequent strategy of publicly announcing “leadership”
contributions and the higher yields achieved when donors act sequentially rather than simultaneously.
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B. Strategic complementarity and substitutability
The intuition for these results is that agents’ actions will (endogenously) be strategic complements or substi-
tutes, depending on whether it is stigma or honor that is most responsive to the extent of participation. This
same condition will also turn out to play a key role in other results, such as those relating to the disclosure
or conﬁdentiality of rewards and the socially optimal level of incentives.
Deﬁnition 1 Participation decisions exhibit strategic complementarities if ∆
0
(va) ≡ µa(M+ − M−)0 <
0 for all va.
When ∆0 < 0, a wider participation (dva < 0) worsens the pool of abstainers more than that of con-
tributors, so that the stigma from abstention ¯ va − M− (va) rises faster than the honor from participation
M+ (va) − ¯ va fades. When ∆0 < −1,o rΨ0 < 0, the resulting net increase in reputational pressure is strong
enough that the marginal agents in [v∗
a − dva,v∗
a], who initially preferred to abstain, now feel compelled to
contribute. This further increases participation and conﬁnes abstention to an even worse pool, etc., leading
to corner solutions as the only stable equilibria, as in Figure 3b. When ∆0 ∈ (−1,0), complementarity is
weak enough that the marginal agents still prefer to stay out, hence stability obtains. This is a fortiori the
case when there is susbtitutability, ∆0 > 0.
Equipped with this general intuition, we now investigate the main factors that make strategic comple-
mentarity —and thus the existence of multiple social norms— more or less likely.
Distribution of social preferences. One expects that stigma considerations will be dominant when the
population includes only a few “bad apples” with very low intrinsic values, which most agents will be eager
to diﬀerentiate themselves from. Formally, an increasing density g(va) makes it more likely that M+ −M−
21is declining: a rise in va hardly increases E (va |˜ va ≥ va) but substantially increases E (va |˜ va ≤ va), since
the weight reallocated at the margin is small relative to that in the upper tail, but large relative to that in
the lower tail. Conversely, honor will dominate when there are only a few heroic or saintly types, whom the
mass of more ordinary individuals would like to be identiﬁed with.28
Proposition 6 (1) (Jewitt (2004)) If the distribution of va has a density that is (a) decreasing, (b) in-
creasing, (c) unimodal, then (M+ − M−)(va) is respectively (a) increasing, (b) decreasing, (c) quasi convex.
(2) If the distribution of va has a log-concave density (more generally, a log-concave distribution function),
then for all µa ∈ [0,1] the supply function is everywhere upward-sloping.
The ﬁrst set of results provide suﬃcient conditions for the monotonicity of M+ − M−, which deﬁnes
complementarity or substitutability. What ultimately matters for uniqueness or multiplicity and the slope
of the supply curve, on the other hand, is the behavior of Ψ(va)=va + µa (M+ − M−)(va), for which
the strength of reputational concerns,µ a, is also relevant. The second result thus shows that for µa ∈ [0,1]
uniqueness obtains as long as g does not increase too fast —a much weaker condition than (1b). No simple
analogue is available for the case of multiplicity, but it is clear that it corresponds to situations where
complementarity obtains and µa is high enough (as in the example given earlier).
Excuses, forced participation, and observability. We have so far assumed that observers (other agents,
future “self”) know for sure that the individual had an opportunity to contribute and whether or not he did.
This is often not the case.
Suppose that with probability δ ∈ [0,1], an individual faces (unveriﬁable) circumstances that preclude
participation: not being informed, having to deal with some emergency, etc. For any potential cutoﬀ va,
the honor conveyed by participation is unchanged, MP(va)=M+ (va), while the stigma conveyed by
non-participation is lessened, taking the form of a weighted average
MNP (va;δ)=
δ¯ va +( 1− δ)G(va)M− (va)
δ +( 1− δ)G(va)
. (27)
The same expressions are easily seen to apply if abstention never gives rise to a signal that the individual
28 Corneo (1997) provides related insights (but no general result) based on whether the value of reputation is
a concave (“conformist”) or a convex (“elitist”) function of someone’s perceived rank (which, by deﬁnition, is
uniformly distributed) in the distribution of altruism.
22contributed, but a contribution may go unnoticed (fail to generate such a signal) with probability δ.
Conversely, suppose that with probability δ
0 ∈ [0,1], an individual is forced to contribute, or draws
a temporarily low cost c The stigma from abstention is now unchanged, MNP(va)=M− (va), but the
distinction conveyed by participation is dulled, and given by
MP ¡
va;δ
0¢
=
δ
0¯ va +
¡
1 − δ
0¢
[1 − G(va)]M+ (va)
δ
0 +
¡
1 − δ
0¢
[1 − G(va)]
. (28)
The same expressions apply if participation always gives rise to a signal suggesting that the individual
contributed, but non-participation can go undetected (also lead to such a signal) with probability δ
0.
Proposition 7 1) An increase in the probability of unobserved forced participation facilitates the emer-
gence of strategic complementarities and multiple social norms, whereas an increase in the probability of
(unobserved) involuntary non-participation inhibits it.
2) The same results hold for, respectively, an increase in the probability that abstention may escape detection
and for an increase in the probability that a good deed goes unnoticed.
The results of this section have empirical and policy implications. First, for behaviors such as crime,
from which most people are deterred by either a strong intrinsic distaste (the density of va is increasing)
or strong extrinsic constraints (a high δ
0), stigma-avoidance will be the dominant reputational concern (by
contrast, having no criminal record is not particularly glorious) and actions will be strategic complements,
potentially leading to substantial variations over time and space. Conversely, opportunities to engage in
heroic behaviors (risking one’s life for someone else, donating an organ or signiﬁcant wealth) are relatively
rare (high δ) and few people are intrinsically motivated to such great feats of abnegation. The signaling
motive will therefore be dominated here by the pursuit of distinction, making noble acts strategic substitutes
and their prevalence much less variable than that of (comparably rare, on average) criminal acts.29 Second,
even absent multiplicity, the two types of behaviors will respond quite diﬀerently to public intervention. For
crime-like behaviors the eﬀect of rewards and punishments (y) is ampliﬁed by the response of social pressure
(crowding in), whereas for self-sacriﬁces it moves in the opposite direction (partial crowding out). We shall
29 A more general intuition can also be oﬀered. For all distributions that have a standard “bell shape”,
or a full support on R,as u ﬃciently high cost of c of behaving prosocially (heroic deeds) will place the
cutoﬀ v∗
a in the upper tail, where ∆ is decreasing (by Part 1.c of Proposition 6), whereas a suﬃciently high cost
of behaving antisocially (crime, persistent non-employment) will place it in the lower tail, where ∆ increases.
23come back to this point when analyzing the socially optimal level of incentives.
IV. Disclosure
Since the presence of material rewards spoils the reputational value of good deeds, it is natural to examine
what will occur when sponsors can keep them conﬁdential, or when agents have the opportunity to turn
them down. Similarly, given that explicit publicity also leads to a discounting of intrinsic motivation, we
will examine the extent to which agents may want to be “modest” about their generosity.
A. Should the fee remain conﬁdential?
We consider here a sponsor (NGO, government agency, religious organization, etc.) that derives from each
agent’s participation a beneﬁt with equivalent monetary value B, relative to its opportunity cost of funds
This could reﬂect the premium placed on a public good by a particularly motivated constituency (friends of
the arts, environmentalists) or some private beneﬁts tied to the delivery of the public good (rents derived by
a government agency, bundling of a religious message together with schooling or poverty relief); B could also
represent, in reduced form, the sponsor’s own signaling or career concerns. We focus here on monopolistic or
specialized sponsors, deferring to the next section the analysis of competition. A sponsor’s expected payoﬀ
from setting a reward rate y is thus equal or proportional to π(y) ≡ n¯ a(y)(B − y).30
We assume that the sponsor can commit to either of two incentive policies: conﬁdentiality (C), under
which only the agent knows the level of y oﬀered (but participation is publicly observable), or public disclosure
(D). We maintain the same speciﬁcation of preferences as above (unknown va’s and vy ≡ 1)a n da s s u m e
Ψ0 > 0 to avoid a multiplicity of participation equilibria. We also assume that the sponsor’s objective
function is quasiconcave in y under both policies.
Conﬁdentiality. The target audience rationally expects a fee and cutoﬀ
¡
yC,vC
a
¢
satisfying vC
a −c+yC +
∆
¡
vC
a
¢
≡ 0. If the sponsor secretly deviates and oﬀers y, it thus faces the ex-post supply curve
¯ aC(y)=1− G
¡
c − y − ∆
¡
vC
a
¢¢
, (29)
30 In the next section we consider sponsors who also internalize (part or all of) social welfare, maximizing the
aw e i g h t e ds u mα¯ U + π, where ¯ U is agents’ average utility and α ∈ [0,1]. One can show that Proposition 8
extends to this case as well, for all α<1. For α =1the sponsor behaves like a social planner and
is indiﬀerent between conﬁdentiality and disclosure.
24and chooses y to maximize πC(y) ≡ ¯ aC(y)(B − y). The equilibrium fee yC is then deﬁned by π0
C(yC)=0 .
Public disclosure.T h e d i ﬀerence is that the fee is now credibly announced and therefore aﬀects the
reputational value of contributions. For any choice of y, the sponsor thus faces the ex-ante supply curve
¯ aD(y)=1− G(c − y − ∆(v∗
a(y))) (30)
and chooses y to maximize πD(y) ≡ ¯ aD(y)(B − y). The equilibrium fee yD is then deﬁned by π0
D(yD)=0 .
Proposition 8 (1) It is optimal for the sponsor to publicly disclose and commit to the fee.
(2) With strategic complements (∆0 < 0), the sponsor oﬀers a higher fee and elicits a higher participation
under disclosure than under public conﬁdentiality. The reverse holds for strategic substitutes (∆0 > 0).
(3) The optimal reward under disclosure yD is immune to secret renegotiation between agents and sponsor
when ∆0 < 0. By contrast, when ∆0 > 0, the equilibrium reward when secret renegotiation is feasible is yC.
Under public disclosure (but not conﬁdentiality), strategic complementarity creates a “bandwagon eﬀect”
that raises the slope of the supply curve and therefore makes announcing higher fees proﬁtable. Ex-post,
the sponsor would like to lower the fee to yC but participants would not agree, so the announced price is
renegociation-proof. Strategic substitutability has the converse eﬀect on supply, leading to yD <y C. In
this case, the sponsor and participants would agree to secretly increase the reward ex-post; anticipating this
collusive renegotiation, the audience properly expects that the actual fee will be yC and not yD.
B. Turning down rewards
An agent may be eager to participate but concerned that his image will be tainted by an inference that
money played a role in the decision. So even when the sponsor oﬀers y, the agent could turn down part or
all of the reward (assuming y>0), or even complement his participation (such as giving blood) with a net
monetary contribution. Is this possibility damaging to our results?
Note ﬁrst that the issue does not arise if give-backs are not observable by the audience to whom agents
are trying to signal, or if the sponsor can reward them secretly. On the other hand, taking secret rewards
does not help with self-image and may even damage it.
Suppose now that the realized transfer from the sponsor to the agent is eﬀectively observed. When the
uncertainty is about va, the net reputational gain from participating for y0 ≤ y, relative to not participating,
25is r(y0)=µa (E (va|1,y0) − E (va|0,y0)). The agent therefore cannot signal his type by turning down any
part of the reward, or even giving money to the sponsor: the loss of monetary income, vy (y − y0),a n dt h e
net reputational beneﬁt, r(y0) − r(y), are both type-independent.
Proposition 9 Let vy ≡ 1, while va is unknown. The equilibria studied in Sections III and IV.A are still
equilibria of the enlarged game in which the individual can turn down part or all of the reward. For the same
reason, oﬀering menus of rewards cannot beneﬁt the sponsor.31
By contrast, when the uncertainty is (also) about vy, which is needed to obtain net crowding-out, turning
down the reward or part of it could be used to signal the absence of greed. Yet even in this case it may
be that all agents either just accept y or do not participate, but never turn down rewards. The intuition
is that doing so could lead the audience to question an agent’s motivation along another dimension: is he
genuinely disinterested, or merely concerned about his social (or self) image? It is thus linked to the general
idea that good deeds that are “too obvious” may backﬁre, which was ﬁrst encountered when studying public
prominence in Section II.B and will recur again when examining private disclosure.
To capture this idea, we allow again uncertainty about v =( va,v y) to combine with uncertainty about
agents’ degree of image-consciousness µ =( µa,µ y) but focus here on a very simple case, to avoid what
would otherwise be a rather technical analysis. Suppose that (µa,µ y)=˜ x(γa,γy), where (γa,γy) is ﬁxed
and thus known to the audience, whereas ˜ x is independently distributed from (va,v y) and takes one of two
extreme values: agents are either image indiﬀerent (˜ x =0 )o rimage driven (˜ x =+ ∞). Image-indiﬀerent
individuals participate if and only if va−c+vyy ≥ 0; when they do, they clearly never turn down the reward
(or part of it), as this would be a strictly dominated strategy. We assume that if the population consisted
only of image-indiﬀerent individuals, participation would yield a better reputation than non-participation
(this always holds for y below some threshold). Turning now to image-driven individuals, they all pool on
the actions that yield the highest reputation, choosing an a ∈ {0,1} and a reward y0 ≤ y that maximize
R(a,y0)=µaE (va|a,y0) − µyE (vy|a,y0). If, in equilibrium, a positive fraction of them chose to participate
and receive y0 <y ,they would be identiﬁed as image-driven types, and so their reputation would correspond
31 It can also be veriﬁed that these equilibria satisfy the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response criterion of In-Koo
Cho and David M. Kreps (1987).
26to the prior mean (¯ va, ¯ vy).32 But they would then be strictly better oﬀ pooling with those image-indiﬀerent
agents who participate at price y. The unique equilibrium thus consists in participation, at the oﬀered price
y, by all image-driven individuals and by those image-indiﬀerent individuals for whom va − c + vyy ≥ 0.
Proposition 10 Agents may never turn down the reward, or part of it, even when this would be publicly
observed and there is uncertainty about vy.
It is worth pointing out that in deriving this result, we did not assume any social opprobrium on image-
consciousness; presumably, this would only reinforce agents’ reluctance to turn down rewards.33
C. Conspicuous versus anonymous generosity
People often react with disapproval when someone tries to buy social prestige by revealing how generous,
disinterested, well-thinking, etc., they are. Conversely, the most admired contributions and sacriﬁces are
anonymous ones. To analyze this phenomenon, let us assume that if an agent participates others will
normally learn of it only with probability x<1. He can, however, make sure that they ﬁnd out by veriﬁably
disclosing his action, by incurring a time or resources cost d. Agents diﬀer again both in their valuation
va for the public good (whereas vy ≡ 1, for simplicity) and in their concern for image γa, with the two
characteristics being independent.
In the symmetric information case where each agent’s γa is observable, one can show that there exist
thresholds 0 <γ ∗
a <γ ∗∗
a such that agents with γa <γ ∗
a never disclose, those with γa >γ ∗∗
a always do and
for γa ∈ [γ∗
a,γ∗∗
a ] there are multiple norms: both disclosure and non-disclosure are equilibrium behaviors,
because the absence of information about an agent’s contribution carries a lower stigma if comparable others
do not disclose than if they do.34
We assume here instead that γa, like va, is unobservable and show that this can reduce disclosure, which
now itself carries a stigma, even though there is no social opprobrium on image-consciousness per se. The
32 If they pooled at multiple values y0, all these would need to deliver the same average reputation, which
would therefore again correspond to the prior mean.
33 The result also implies that oﬀering menus of rewards along which agents with diﬀerent vy’s could
sort themselves, which is optimal when µ is known (see Bénabou and Tirole (2004b) for an analysis),
may still not beneﬁt sponsors when people also diﬀer in their in image-consciousness.
34 Thus, if most people belong to some church, synagogue or mosque, anyone who does not risks being seen
as a selﬁsh materialist, since “doing good” through other channels is less easily demonstrable. The symmetric-
information case is omitted here for brevity but can be found in Bénabou and Tirole (2004b).
27idea is that since the people most prone to advertise their good deeds are those with a high concern for
image, disclosure of a prosocial act makes it more likely that it was motivated by image-seeking (a high γa)
rather than genuine altruism (a high va). Formally, suppose that γa takes values γH
a for a fraction θ of agents
and γL
a ≤ γH
a for the remaining 1 −θ, such that, under symmetric information, it is an equilibrium for type
γH
a to disclose and type γL
a not to do so. We show the following results.
Proposition 11 Under asymmetric information about the extent of image-consciousness γa :
(1) In a separating equilibrium where the γH
a types disclose while the γL
a ones do not, disclosure of one’s
contribution to the public good carries a stigma, in that the inferences about the individual’s prosocial orien-
tation are not as favorable as when participation is revealed through other channels: vH
a <v L
a .
(2) Asymmetric information about the extent of image-consciousness can reduce disclosure: for some range
of values of d, the γH
a type no longer discloses when γa is unobservable.
3) Suppose that γL
a =0(so type γL
a never discloses) and that disclosure (by the agent or the sponsor) is rela-
tively cheap. Then, starting from either a separating equilibrium as in (1), or one with pooling at no-disclosure
as in (2), the sponsor gains from a policy under which contributions are systematically disclosed.
A commitment to automatic disclosure acts as a remedy to asymmetric information about γa, as it relieves
agents from the suspicion of image-seeking attached to discretionary disclosure. This leaves only the direct
eﬀect of an increased visibility of actions, which raises the reputational incentive to participate and thereby
increases the sponsors’ payoﬀ at any given level of y.
V. Welfare and Competition
We now examine the way in which public or private sponsors will set incentives and the welfare properties
of the resulting equilibrium. For these purposes, we need to make explicit again the public-good aspects of
agents’ contributions. Recall from Section I.A that an individual’s intrinsic motivation can, in general, have
two components: va = ua + wa/nκ, where ua is a pure “joy of giving” whereas wa is the marginal utility of
a public good n¯ a/nκ generated by total contributions n¯ a. To simplify the analysis, we take here ua and wa
to be independently distributed (with again vy ≡ 1) and denote the mean of wa as ¯ wa.
G i v e na ni n c e n t i v er a t ey, an equilibrium (unique or not) is determined by a cutoﬀ v∗
a. Agents’ (expected)
28average welfare is thus
¯ U(v∗
a;y) ≡ E [wa (n¯ a/nκ)] + E [a(ua − c + y)+µava] (31)
=
Z v+
a
v∗
a
[(n − 1)( ¯ wa/nκ)+va − c + y]g(va)dva + µava.
This expression embodies three eﬀects. First, each agent who contributes enjoys a direct utility va − c + y
and additionally generates for the n − 1 others a positive spillover, equal to ¯ wa/nκ on average. Second, the
pursuit of esteem is a zero-sum game: the average reputation in society remains ﬁxed at µava, reﬂecting the
martingale property of beliefs.35 Third, because an agent’s participation decision is based on the private
reputational return rather the social one (which is zero), it inﬂicts an externality onto others. Thus, starting
from equilibrium, the welfare impact of a marginal increase in participation is
−
∂ ¯ U(v∗
a;y)
∂v∗
a
=[ ( n − 1)( ¯ wa/nκ)+v∗
a − c + y]g(va)=[ ( n − 1)( ¯ wa/nκ) − ∆(v∗
a)]g(va). (32)
The ﬁrst term is the standard public-goods externality, which we shall denote as ¯ e ≡ (n − 1)( ¯ wa/nκ).
T h es e c o n dt e r mr e ﬂects the fact that each marginal participant brings down the “quality” of the pool
of contributors as well as that of non-contributors: by the martingale property, the reputational losses of
inframarginal agents on both sides must add up to the gains of the marginal participant, ∆(v∗
a). Equivalently,
we can think of (32) as the diﬀerence between a free-riding eﬀect and a reputation-stealing eﬀect.
A. Sponsors’ choice of incentives and the social optimum
Let B again denote the private monetary value of the beneﬁt that participation by an agent confers to a
sponsor. In addition, the sponsor could also internalize part or all of agents’ welfare. The general form of a
monopolistic sponsor’s payoﬀ is thus
¯ W(y) ≡ α¯ U(v∗
a(y);y)+π(y), (33)
where π(y)=n¯ a(y)(B − y) and α ∈ [0,1]. For a social planner whose preferences mirror the ex-ante
utility of the n potential contributors and who has access to lump-sum taxes, α =1and B =0 . More
35 That is, E [E [va|a,y]] = ¯ va. It thus does not matter whether or not we include agents’ utilities from
reputation (e.g., vanity) in the deﬁnition of social welfare. Note that the zero-sum property also relies
on the linearity of the reputational payoﬀ and the independence of µa from va. When these assumptions do
not hold, the distribution of reputation across agents will have allocative and eﬃciency consequences —
for instance, through subsequent matching patterns.
29generally, B ≥ 0 could reﬂect a diﬀerent discounting of the welfare of future generations (e.g., with pollution
or biodiversity) and α ≤ 1 the presence of a shadow cost of public funds: clearly, replacing B − y by
B −(1+λ)y in π(y) is equivalent to dividing both B and α in (33) by 1+λ. For other actors such as NGO’s
or specialized government agencies, B reﬂects the purely private beneﬁts (material or reputational) that the
sponsor derives from contributions transiting through it and α the weight it places on social welfare, both
normalized by the sponsors’ own opportunity cost of funds.36
Since rewards that lead to net crowding out, ¯ a0(y) < 0, are never optimal, we assume that Ψ0 > 0,
resulting in a unique equilibrium v∗
a(y) and supply curve n¯ a(y)=n[1 − G(v∗
a(y))], with elasticity ε(y) ≡
y¯ a0(y)/¯ a(y) > 0. We also assume that ¯ W is strictly quasiconcave in all cases (it always is for α =1 ) . Using
(32) and noting that ¯ a0(y)=−(v∗
a)
0 (y) · g(v∗
a(y)), we have
¯ W0(y)=[ α(¯ e − ∆(v∗
a(y))) + B − y] · ¯ a0(y) − (1 − α)¯ a(y). (34)
For (symmetric) competitive sponsors, the term π(y) in (33) is replaced by πi(y) ≡ n¯ ai(y)(B − yi), where
¯ ai(y) is the share of total supply speciﬁcally channeled to sponsor i; in equilibrium, all rewards are driven
to B.37 We shall denote the values of α,B, ¯ W and y for the social planner, monopolistic and competitive
sponsors by the superscripts s, m and c respectively, with αs > max{αm,α c}.
Proposition 12 1) The socially optimal incentive rate,
ys =
αs [¯ e − ∆(v∗
a(ys))] + Bs
1+( 1− αs)/ε(ys)
, (35)
is strictly less than the standard Pigouvian subsidy yP ≡ ¯ e + Bs that leads agents to internalize the full
public-good value of their contribution, even when taxation is non-distortionary (αs =1 ) .
2) A monopoly sponsor with αm <α s may oﬀer contributors a reward ym that is too generous (or, require of
them too low a monetary donation) from the point of view of social welfare, resulting in excess participation.
This is true even when the beneﬁts it derives from agents’ participation coincide exactly with the gap between
36 It is worth recalling here that the model also applies to charitable monetary donations; see footnote 9.
37 While this is the standard result, it depends here crucially on the fact that vy =1is known. Otherwise,
there is a reputational payoﬀ to participating for a lower fee and sponsor competition will then lead to
rewards being bid down rather than up, leaving ﬁrms with positive proﬁts. This “reversal” of Bertrand
competition is analyzed in Bénabou and Tirole (2004b) and shares important similarities with Bagwell
and Bernheim’s (1996) analysis of the pricing of conspicuous-consumption goods.
30their social and private contributions to the public good (Bm + αm¯ e = Bs + αs¯ e).
3) Competition between sponsors increases rewards (or, reduces required monetary contributions) and may
thus reduce social welfare, compared to a monopoly (with the same αc = αm and Bc = Bm).
The ﬁrst result shows, most transparently when αs =1 , that the optimal incentive scheme should include
a tax that corrects for the reputation-seeking motive to contribute, which in itself is socially wasteful. This
reputational rent is endogenous to the reward, however. Thus with αs =1 , when individual contributions
are complements (resp., substitutes) ys responds less (resp., more) than yP to changes in Bs (which leave the
function ∆ unchanged). Similarly, the optimal penalty for antisocial activities such as littering, polluting,
etc., should “leave space” for the eﬀect of opprobrium, which itself depends on the ﬁne. As to a higher
shadow cost of public funds (a proportional reduction in αs and Bs), it naturally tends to reduce ys; when
contributions are substitutes, some of this reduced public intervention is made up by increased social pressure,
as ∆ rises in response to the decline in participation. With complements, however, the reputational incentive
to contribute is also weakened. These results provide both some support and an important qualiﬁcation to
arguments (e.g. Brennan and Pettit (2004)) calling for a shift in public policy from the use of ﬁnes and other
costly sentences to a greater reliance on public praise and shame. Esteem-based incentives can adequately
replace material rewards and punishments in spheres where gaining distinction is the dominant reputational
concern (self-sacriﬁce, heroism, great inventions), but not in those where avoiding stigma is most important
(crime, welfare dependency). This point, in turn, suggests that scarce public funds should be allocated much
more to fostering prosocial behaviors (and discouraging antisocial ones) of the latter kind than of the former.
The intuition for the second result in Proposition 12 is that a monopolist setting ym does not not
internalize the reputational losses of inframarginal agents to the same extent as a planner would. This gives
it an incentive to attract too many “customers”, which works against the standard monopolistic tendency
to serve too few. The tension between these two forces can be seen from the fact that
¡ ¯ Ws¢0 (ym) < 0 if
(αs − αm)[ym/ε(ym) − ∆(v∗
a(ym))] + Bs + αs¯ e − Bm − αm¯ e<0. (36)
A low supply elasticity ε causes the monopolist to oﬀer too low a price, as usual. When reputational
concerns are important enough, however (a high µa and therefore a high ∆), the informational externality
can dominate, making the monopolist too “generous” or not demanding enough in the standards it sets for
31monetary donations. The last two terms in (36), ﬁnally, represent the the total beneﬁts (private beneﬁtp l u s
internalized contribution to social welfare) derived by each sponsor from a marginal agent’s participation,
each normalized by the corresponding shadow cost of funds. The eﬀect of their diﬀerence on the sign of
ym − ys is straightforward, and Part (2) of the proposition normalizes it to zero as a benchmark.
Sponsor competition, ﬁnally, further exacerbates the above ineﬃciency, because each ﬁrm now has a much
higher incentive to raise its oﬀer than a monopolist (it takes the whole market), but still inﬂicts the same
reputational cost on all inframarginal non-contributors. This suggests, for instance, that universities may
sell the naming rights to professorial chairs and buildings too cheaply, relative to the social optimum.
Quality of participation. Sponsors often care about “high-quality” participation, not just total en-
rollment. This arises when participation is an open-ended contract, subject to adverse selection or moral
hazard. Thus, one argument for relatively low pay for the military is to select true patriots rather than
people whose main loyalty is to money (e.g., mercenaries who may ﬁnd out one day that the enemy pays
better). Similarly, it is often argued that not paying for blood reduces the fraction of donors with hepatitis
and other diseases. These ideas can be captured by introducing a hidden action (beyond a ∈ A, which is ob-
served) whose marginal cost to the individual decreases with va, l e a d i n gt oab e n e ﬁt for the sponsor B (va),
with B0 > 0. The theory is then the same, with for example a private sponsor (α =0 ) now maximizing
π(y) ≡ Ev,µ [(B (va) − y)a(v,µ; y)].
B. Holier-than-thou competition
We saw that competition may reduce welfare by inducing excessive participation in prosocial activities that
generate only moderate public-good beneﬁts but have a high visibility. We will now see that it can reduce
welfare (relative to a monopolist) even without any change in participation, by leading sponsors to screen
contributors in ineﬃcient ways. This result formalizes in particular the idea of religions and sects competing
on orthodoxy, asceticism and other costly requirements for membership (e.g., Eli Berman (2000)). Another
example of rapidly growing importance is that of charities sponsoring events where agents, instead of simply
donating or raising money (or on top of it), engage time-intensive, strenuous activities such as a day-long
walk, marathon or other test of endurance.
To capture this phenomenon most simply, let va take values vH
a with probability ρ or vL
a <v H
a with
32probability 1−ρ, while maintaining vy ≡ 1. Assume, furthermore, that the non-monetary cost of contributing
is c (possibly zero) unless the sponsor demands a “sacriﬁce”, which it is able to verify and publicly certify.
The cost then becomes cH for the high type and cL for the low type, where
c<c H <c L. (37)
As a c r i ﬁce is a pure deadweight loss, whose only beneﬁt is to help screen agents’ motivation. The assumption
that cL >c H reﬂects the idea that such a sacriﬁce is less costly to a more motivated agent. For simplicity, we
will assume that cL is so large that the low type is never willing to sacriﬁce and will focus on deterministic
contracts oﬀered by sponsors who seeking to maximize their private payoﬀ π(y); that is, we set α =0(the
results would extend to any α<1).
Proposition 13 In the two-type case described above, a monopoly sponsor who wants both types to con-
tribute does not screen contributors ineﬃciently. By contrast, competing sponsors may require high-valuation
individuals to make costly sacriﬁces that represent pure deadweight losses, thereby reducing social welfare.
The intuition for this result is that non-price screening imposes a negative externality on low-type agents,
the cost of which a monopolist must fully bear but which competitive sponsors do not internalize. Indeed,
screening through costly sacriﬁces has two eﬀe c t s :a )i ti n ﬂicts a deadweight loss cH − c on the high type,
which the sponsor must somehow pay for; b) it boosts the high type’s reputation and lowers that of the low
type. When the high-type’s reputational gain exceeds the cost of sacriﬁce, the sponsor through which he
contributes can appropriate the surplus, in the form of a lower reward. If this sponsor is a monopolist who
ﬁnds it proﬁt a b l et os e r v et h ew h o l em a r k e t( w h i c hi sa l w a y st h ec a s ew h e nρ is low enough), he must also
compensate the low type for his reputational loss. By a now familiar argument, these losses must exactly
oﬀset the high type’s reputation gains, so the net eﬀect of (b) on agents’ average utility, as well as on the
monopolist’s payoﬀ, is nil. This leaves only the net cost corresponding to (a), implying that a sponsor serving
the whole market will never require sacriﬁces.
Things are quite diﬀerent under free entry. First, since vy is known, price competition again drives
all sponsors to oﬀer B. Second, by requiring a sacriﬁce, entrants can now attract the high types away
from competitors who impose no such requirement, leaving low-types (or their sponsors) with the resulting
reputational loss. This “cream-skimming” leads inevitably to an equilibrium where a proportion ρ of the
33contracts oﬀered by active sponsors require an ineﬃcient sacriﬁce and attract only high-types, while the
remaining 1 − ρ require only the normal contribution c and attract the low types.38
Turning ﬁnally to welfare, one can show that both types of agents are better oﬀ under competition than
under monopoly (see the appendix). The sponsors or their underlying beneﬁciaries, however, must necessarily
lose more than all contributors gain: total participation remains unchanged (both types still contribute), the
same is true of average reputation (by the martingale property), and rewards are pure transfers. There is
now, however, a deadweight loss of ρ(cH −c), corresponding to the wasteful sacriﬁces made by the high-types
to separate. Therefore, competition unambiguously reduces welfare.
VI. Conclusion
To gain a better understanding of prosocial behavior we sought, paraphrasing Adam Smith, to “thoroughly
enter into all the passions and motives which inﬂuence it”. People’s actions indeed reﬂect a variable mix of
altruistic motivation, material self-interest and social or self image concerns. Moreover, this mix varies across
individuals and situations, presenting observers seeking to infer a person’s true values from his behavior (or
an individual judging himself in retrospect) with a signal-extraction problem. Crucially, altering any of the
three components of motivation, for instance through the use of extrinsic incentives or a greater publicity
given to actions, changes the meaning attached to prosocial (or antisocial) behavior and hence feeds back
onto the reputational incentive to engage in it.
This simple mechanism lead to many new insights concerning individuals’ contributions to public goods as
well as the strategic decisions of public or private sponsors seeking to increase or capture these contributions.
This line of research could be extended in several interesting directions. A ﬁrst one concerns organizations,
where high-powered incentives or performance pay could potentially conﬂict with agents’ signaling motives
that arise from teamwork or career concerns. A second relates to the role and objectives of sponsors, who in
practice often have their own signaling concerns. A third one, linked to the self-image interpretation of the
model, is to the topic of identity and the many instances where people refuse transactions that seem to be
in their best economic interest, but which they judge to be insulting to their dignity.
38 As long as ρ is not too large, this is the only equilibrium that is robust to the Cho-Kreps (1987) criterion.
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Proof of Proposition 1: Since y is simply a ﬁxed parameter, in what follows we will temporarily omit
from the notation the dependence of all functions on this argument. Diﬀerentiating (9)-(10) with respect to
a yields
dE (va|a)
da
= ρ[k − ¯ r(a)] and
dE (vy|a)
da
= χ[k − ¯ r(a)]. (A.1)
Therefore, ¯ r(a) is a solution to the linear diﬀerential equation ¯ r(a)=µ(k − ¯ r0(a)), where µ ≡ ¯ µaρ−¯ µyχ ≷ 0.
The generic solution is ¯ r(a)=k
¡
µ + ζe−a/µ¢
, where ζ is a constant of integration. Equation(4) yields
a∗(v)=( va + y · vy)/k + µ + κe−a/µ and substituting into (9)-(10), we obtain:
E (va|a∗(v)) = ¯ va + ρ ·
³
va − ¯ va − y · (vy − ¯ vy) − κe−a/µk
´
(A.2)
E (vy|a∗(v)) = ¯ vy + χ ·
³
va − ¯ va − y · (vy − ¯ vy) − κe−a/µk
´
(A.3)
Applying the law of iterated expectations over v shows that κ =0 , concluding the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n s2a n d3 :From (11), we have
ρ0(y)=−
2yσ2
aσ2
y + σay
¡
σ2
a + y2σ2
y
¢
¡
σ2
a +2 yσay + y2σ2
y
¢2 , (A.4)
χ0(y)=
σ2
y
¡
σ2
a − y2σ2
y
¢
− 2σay
¡
yσ2
y + σay
¢
¡
σ2
a +2 yσay + y2σ2
y
¢2 . (A.5)
Substituting into (14) immediately yields Part (1) of Proposition 3 in the case y =0 , and Part (1) of
Proposition 2 when σay =0 . This last inequality can be rewritten as
Q(y)=( ¯ vy/k)
¡
1+y2θ
2¢2
+¯ µyθ
4y2 < 2¯ µaθ
2y +¯ µyθ
2 ≡ L(y). (A.6)
The left hand side is a second order polynomial in y2, hence convex and symmetric over all of R, with value
Q(0) = ¯ vy/k > 0 at the origin. The right-hand side is an increasing linear function with L(0) = ¯ µyθ
2.
Consequently, if L(0) ≥ Q(0), then for any ¯ µa > 0,L (y) intersects Q(y) once on at some y1 < 0 and once
at some y2 > 0. If L(0) <Q (0), on the other hand, then there exists a unique µ∗
a > 0 for which L(y) has
a (single) tangency point y∗ > 0 with Q(y). For all ¯ µa <µ ∗
a,Q (y˙ ) >L (y) on all of R∗ ,s o¯ a0(y) > 0
everywhere. For all ¯ µa >µ ∗
a, however, L(y) intersects Q(y) twice, at points 0 <y 1 <y 2. These properties,
together with the linearity of L in ¯ µay and the convexity of Q(y), conclude the proof of Proposition 2.
35Part (2) of Proposition 3 follow from the fact that, given Part (1), as θ = σy/σa → +∞ the dominant
term in ¯ a0(0) is asymptotically equivalent to −¯ µyθ
2
h
1 − 2(σay/σaσy)
2
i
, which tends to −∞ as long as the
correlation between va and vy is less than 1/
√
2 in absolute value. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: The only diﬀerence with Proposition 1 is the presence of the term Ω(y)2 = k2
Va r[r(y;µ)] in the denominator of ρ and χ (see (19)), leading to the ﬁxed-point equation deﬁning Ω(y):
Ω2 = k2Va r
"
µa
µ
σ2
a + yσay
σ2
a +2 yσay + y2σ2
y + Ω2
¶
− µy
Ã
yσ2
y + σay
σ2
a +2 yσay + y2σ2
y + Ω2
!#
≡ Z(Ω2). (A.7)
Since Z(Ω2) is always positive but tends to zero as Ω2 becomes large, there is always at least one solution.
When ωay =0 , moreover, Z(Ω2) is the sum of two squared terms that are decreasing in Ω2, so the solution
is unique. When ωay 6=0 , one cannot rule out multiple equilibria; note, however, that those that are stable
(in a standard, tâtonnement sense) are those where Z cuts the diagonal from above. Therefore, in any stable
equilibrium Ω is increasing in k, w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a tρ(y) and χ(y) are decreasing in k, as long as σay
is not too negative. Finally, multiplying all the
¡
µa,µ y
¢
’s by a common “publicity factor” x has the same
eﬀect on (A.7) as multiplying k2 by x, which concludes the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 : Part (1) is due to Jewitt (2004). For Part (2), we can write:
va + µa
£
M+ (va) − M− (va)
¤
= va − M− (va)+µaM+ (va)+( 1− µa)M− (va),
then observe that both M+and M− are increasing functions, and so is va−M− (va)=
³R va
−∞ G(v)dv
´
/G(va)
if the integral of G is log-concave. Since log-concavity is preserved by integration over convex sets, it suﬃces
that G itself be log-concave. In turn, a suﬃcient condition for this is that g be log-concave. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 :To show (1), rewrite
¡
MP − MNP¢
(va;δ)=[ M+ (va) − ¯ va]/[1 − (1 − δ)(1−
G(va)] and observe that if (MP − MNP)0 (va;δ) > 0, this expression is also positive for all δ
0 >δ ,since
1
(MP − MNP)(va;δ
0)
=
1
(MP − MNP)(va;δ)
+
¡
δ
0 − δ
¢
(1 − G(va))
M+ (va) − ¯ va
and the last term is clearly decreasing in va. Similarly, to show (2) note that in this case
¡
MP − MNP¢
(va;δ)=
[¯ va − M− (va)/][1− (1 − δ)G(va)] and that if
¡
MP − MNP¢0 (va;δ) < 0, it is also negative for all δ
0 >δ . ¥
36P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 : (1) A sponsor with the ability to credibly commit to the terms of the contract
he oﬀers can always replicate the equilibrium choice of one without commitment. Since we show below that
he chooses a diﬀerent fee (as long as ∆0 6=0), he must in fact do strictly better.
(2) and (3). With disclosure, if the sponsor still chooses y = yC the reservation value and level of supply
that result remain the same as in the conﬁdentiality equilibrium: since vC
a −c+yC+∆
¡
vC
a
¢
≡ 0 by deﬁnition,
v∗
a(yC)=vC
a and therefore ¯ aD(yC)=¯ aC(yC). The elasticity (or slope) of supply at yC is diﬀerent, however:
¯ a0
C(yC)=g
¡
c − yC − ∆
¡
vC
a
¢¢
, whereas (A.8)
¯ a
0
D(yC)=g
¡
c − yC − ∆
¡
vC
a
¢¢
[1 + ∆0 (v∗
a(y))v∗0
a (y] (A.9)
= g
¡
c − yC − ∆
¡
vC
a
¢¢
[1 + ∆0 (v∗
a(y))]
−1 ,
by the deﬁnition of v∗
a(y). Therefore, if ∆0 < 0 we have ¯ a
0
D(yC) > ¯ a0
C(yC), hence
π0
D(yC)=¯ a0
D(yC)(B − yC) − ¯ aD(yC)=¯ a0
D(yC)(B − yC) − ¯ aC(yC)
> ¯ a0
C(yC)(B − yC) − ¯ aC(yC)=π0
C(yC) ≡ 0.
Since πD is assumed to be quasiconcave, this implies yD >y C and therefore also ¯ aD(yD) > ¯ aD(yC)=¯ aC(yC).
The same reasoning works in reverse when ∆0 > 0. Part (3), ﬁn a l l y ,w a sp r o v e di nt h et e x t .¥
Proof of Proposition 11: We shall assume all supply curves to be uniquely deﬁned and upward sloping
(Ψ0 > 0, for the relevant Ψ).
(1) Let ˆ vL
a and ˆ vH
a be the valuation cutoﬀs used under symmetric information by types γL
a and γH
a
respectively (in the equilibrium under consideration). In particular, b vH
a must satisfy
b vH
a + γH
a
£
M+ ¡
b vH
a
¢
− M− ¡
b vH
a
¢¤
= c + d − y, (A.10)
γH
a (1 − x)
£
M+(b vH
a ) − M−(b vH
a )
¤
≥ d. (A.11)
For ˆ vL
a, in the ﬁrst equation γH
a is replaced by xγL
a and d by zero. In the second one, γH
a is replaced by γL
a and
the inequality is reversed. Consider now a separating equilibrium under asymmetric information, in which
types γH
a and γL
a participate when va is above the cutoﬀs vH
a and vL
a respectively. The posterior expectations
of va, conditioned respectively on disclosure and on the information that the individual participated but did
not disclose, are E
¡
va |D;vH
a
¢
= M+(vH
a ) and E
¡
va
¯ ¯N;vL
a
¢
= M+(vL
a), while
37E
¡
va
¯ ¯φ,vH
a ,vL
a
¢
≡
θ
R vH
a
0 vg(v)dv +( 1− θ)
hR vL
a
0 vg(v)dv +( 1− x)
R ∞
vL
a vg(v)dv
i
θG(vH
a )+( 1− θ)[G(vL
a)+( 1− x)(1 − G(vL
a)]
(A.12)
is the updated reputation in the absence of information. Thus vH
a and vL
a are deﬁned by
vH
a + γH
a
£
M+(vH
a ) − E
¡
va
¯ ¯φ,vH
a ,vL
a
¢¤
= c + d − y, (A.13)
vL
a + γL
ax
£
M+(vL
a ) − E
¡
va
¯ ¯φ,vH
a ,vL
a
¢¤
= c − y, (A.14)
where the Ψ-type functions in (A.13) and (A.14) are assumed to be increasing. These two inequalities,
together with the image-conscious type γH
a ’s willingness to disclose,
γH
a
£
M+(vH
a ) − xM+(vL
a) − (1 − x)E
¡
va
¯ ¯φ,vH
a ,vL
a
¢¤
≥ d, (A.15)
imply that vH
a <v L
a.
(2) We demonstrate the claim by way of an example: suppose that x =0(generally, x is not too large).
Then (A.15) and (A.10) respectively reduce to:
∆H
D(vH
a ) ≡ γH
a
Ã
θG(vH
a )
£
M+(vH
a ) − M−(vH
a )
¤
+( 1− θ)[M+(vH
a ) − ¯ va]
θG(vH
a )+( 1− θ)
!
≥ d,
b ∆H
D(b vH
a ) ≡ γH
a
£
M+(b vH
a ) − M−(b vH
a )
¤
≥ d,
Note that b ∆H
D(va) > ∆H
D(va) for all va. Assuming that 1+
³
b ∆H
D
´0
> 0 and using the fact that vH
a +∆H
D(vH
a )
and b vH
a + b ∆H
D(b vH
a ) both equal = c + d − y, we obtain b vH
a <v H
a , hence ∆H
D(vH
a ) < b ∆H
D(b vH
a ). Hence, for
∆H
D(vH
a ) <d<b ∆H
D(b vH
a ), disclosure by γH
a types no longer occurs under asymmetric information about γa.
(3) Let xL and xH ∈ {x,1} denote the two types’ “visibility” parameters. When γL
a =0 , vL
a does not vary
with xL and/or xH. In a pooling equilibrium xL = xH = x, s oas y s t e m a t i cd i s c l o s u r ep o l i c y(xL = xH =1 )
alters neither E
¡
va
¯ ¯1,vH
a ,vL
a
¢
nor E
¡
va
¯ ¯φ,vH
a ,vL
a
¢
.T h u s ,t y p eγH
a ’s reputational incentive is multiplied by
1/x and vH
a decreases. In a separating equilibrium, xL = x and xH =1 . Keeping xH =1 , E
¡
va
¯ ¯1,vH
a ,vL
a
¢
increases with xL, while E
¡
va
¯ ¯φ,vH
a ,vL
a
¢
decreases with it. Hence vH
a decreases when xL increases. ¥
Proof of Proposition 12: Part (1) follows from (34) and the assumed strict quasiconcavity of ¯ Ws.
The additional properties stated in the text for the case αs =1follow from the fact that we then have
¡ ¯ Ws¢0 (y)=[ Bs +¯ e − ϕ(y)] · ¯ a0(y), where ϕ(y) ≡ y + ∆(v∗
a(y)) is such that
38ϕ0(y)=1−
∆0(v∗
a(y))
Ψ0(v∗
a(y))
=
1
Ψ0(v∗
a(y))
=
1
1+∆0(v∗
a(y))
> 0. (A.16)
and ϕ(−∞)=−∞ = −ϕ(+∞). Therefore, ¯ W(y) is strictly concave and maximized at the point where
ys = Bs +¯ e − ∆(v∗
a(ys), which is such that dys/dB ≷ 1 as ∆0(v∗
a(ys)) ≶ 0.
For Part (2), note that (36) holds for all Bm +αm¯ e ≤ Bs +αs¯ e as long as ∆(v∗
a(ym)) > ¯ a(y)/¯ a0(y), or
∆(v∗
a)
Ψ0 (v∗
a)
µ
g(v∗
a)
1 − G(v∗
a)
¶
> 1, (A.17)
where v∗.
a stands for v∗
a(ym). For instance, for αm =0and va uniformly distributed on U [0,1], we have
v∗
a(ym)=( c−µa/2+1−B)/2 ∈ (0,1) and ym =( B − 1+c − µa/2)/2 as long as −µa/2 < 1+B−c<2−µa/2.
Thus ym >y s = B+¯ e−µa/2 whenever µa > 1+B−c+2¯ e, which is consistent with the previous inequalities
as long as µa > 2¯ e. Part (3), ﬁnally, is implied by Part (2), since yc = Bc = Bm >y m and ¯ Ws is declining
to the right of ys. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 3 :(1) As long as ρ is not too small, it is optimal for the monopolist to get both
types on board. If he does not demand any sacriﬁce, he sets y so as to make the low type indiﬀerent::
y = c − vL
a − µa
¡
¯ va − vL
a
¢
, where ¯ va ≡ ρvH
a +( 1− ρ)vL
a is the prior mean. The sponsor’s payoﬀ is then:
π1 ≡ B − y = B − c + vL
a + µa
¡
¯ va − vL
a
¢
. (A.18)
Suppose now that the high type is asked to sacriﬁce. Rewards are then yL = c − vL
a and (from incentive
compatibility) yH = yL + cH − c − µa
¡
vH
a − vL
a
¢
. The sponsor’s payoﬀ is then only
π2 = B − ρyH − (1 − ρ)yL = π1 − ρ
¡
cH − c
¢
<π 1. (A.19)
(2) Under free entry all sponsors oﬀer, and all contributors accept, y = B.M o r e o v e r , i f cH − c ≤
µa
¡
vH
a − vL
a
¢
, it is now an equilibrium for the high type to separate from the low type by opting for a
sponsor who requires a sacriﬁce. In the resulting equilibrium (described in the text), both types of agents
are better oﬀ than under monopoly: the low type’s payoﬀ rises from µavL
a to µavL
a + vL
a − c + B, while the
high type’s payoﬀ increases by at least vL
a − c + B, which is positive from the condition that the monopoly
prefers to enlist both types. The fact that sponsors must necessarily lose more than the agents gain, resulting
in a net welfare loss from competition, was established in the text. ¥
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